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In 1918, the American historian Henry Adams wrote: 
Modern politics is, a t  bottom, a struggle not of men but of forces. The men 
become every year more and more creatures of force, massed about central 
power houses. The conflict is no longer between the men, but between the 
motors that drive the men. 
For those who hold such views today, the approach to understanding conflict and 
resolving differences presented in this essay will be of little relevance. However, 
for persons who have found that individual men and women can influence and 
shape the outcome of political events, a model of conflict interaction and 
intervention that takes the motivational and situational dynamics of disputing 
individuals into account is likely to be of considerable interest. 
For change agents, the test of any theoretical model of human behavior 
inheres not in its power to illuminate general causal laws but in its ability to 
clarify effective ways of making decisions and taking action with regard to 
particular actors in specific circumstances. For social scientists concerned with 
developing "knowledge for practice," the consequent challenge is to develop models 
that provide useful knowledge for actually carrying out appropriate situational 
interventions or for guiding selection among a range of possible action alternatives. 
This may be accomplished through their ordering and organization of experience. 
The interpersonal conflict model described in this paper is such an effort. 
First developed and applied in an organizational context (Leas, 1985), then 
extended and refined through its application to family disputes (Weingarten & 
Leas, 1987), although based on previous work, the approach described here is 
more 'speculative. While it is hoped that this model can contribute to the actual 
process of choosing and generating effective and non-violent strategies for conflict 
management in international disputes, it has not yet been tested in the field. 
Nonetheless, the experience of those who have used similar models to design their 
approach to family, organizational, and community conficts argues for its 
introduction to the international community. 
The Levels of Interpersonal Conflict Model (LICM) is a tool to help 
disputants and third party intervenors recognize the types of conflict situations 
facing them and use this knowledge to plan their subsequent actions. It identifies 
critical dimensions of conflict interaction and helps to organize what is often a 
confusing array of facts into coherent conceptual categories. The LICM developed 
out of dissatisfaction with academic theories of interpersonal conflict that did not 
help practitioners to differentially diagnose the wide variety of conflicts they were 
called upon to manage. 
Third parties involved in dispute resolution commonly need to demonstrate 
that their interventions result in "better" resolutions than those that principals 
would be likely to implement on their own. This is not always easy. Techniques 
and strategies that are effective in helping Group A resolve a dispute over money 
do not work with Group C -- even though the presenting problem is the same. 
Behaviors that may signal to an American businessman that a frnal settlement 
has been reached may be interpreted by his Chinese counterpart as evidence that 
the building of trust and a working relationship has just begun. 
Those who would choose to aid in the resolution of conflict need models of 
human behavior that will help them design interventions able to fit a world 
considerably more complex than an iterated prisoners dilemma game. 
Practitioners are beginning to abandon the assumption that people render 
decisions rationally in favor of the proposition that people select means and goals 
primarily on the basis of their values, emotions, and social bonds. So, too, the 
assumption that people choose to maximize one utility (usually identified as 
personal pleasure or interest) has been replaced by the proposition that people 
have multiple objectives which include, but are not limited to, needs to solve 
problems, to maintain self-esteem, to win, to control others, to stabilize power, to 
enact revenge and so forth. 
I t  is not that rationality is denied. Indeed, a working d e f ~ t i o n  of
"rationality" as an efficient choice of means to advance one's goals is presupposed. 
Rather, the LICM is designed to clarify the factors that influence the exercise of 
rationality in conflict interaction and to identify motives, goals, emotions, and 
cognitions that play a critical role in shaping conflict behavior. 
The Model 
The LICM delineates individual differences in motivation and world view 
that systematically influence the way contested issues are approached. It is not a 
. L. theory of behavior. It does not posit a dominant motivational construct as the 
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-c -_ - deterskinant of behavior in diverse interpersonal conflict situations. Rather five 
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different levels of interpersonal conflict are identified within the model: (1) 
A Problems, (2) Disagreements, (3) Contests, (4) Fights, and (5) War. As Table 1 
[ *- - ;y 
summarizes, each level is distinguished from the others by the presence of 
L 5- charadteristic (a) motives, goals or intentions, (b-c) expectations, assumptions, and 
. . beliefs (about the self, the other, and the situational context), (d) emotional 
climates, and (e) behavioral styles. 
Questions the model can be used to clarify include: What dynamic does a 
given instance of interpersonal conflict reflect? What personality and structural 
factors determine leverage points for change? What approach to a given conflict is 
likely to result in its satisfactory resolution? Is a particular strategy of conflict 
resolution that worked in one case likely to work in another? If not, why not, and 
what alternative should be tried? 
Within the model, the presence of conflict per se is not viewed as a sign that 
a relationship or organization or nation is in trouble. Rather, the presence of 
conflict may signal a social system's level of vitality. It is the way that people 
handle the conflicts that inevitably arise between them that indicates whether 
their relationships (and the social systems of which they are a part) will be 
strengthened or weakened as a result. 
In order for conflict management strategies to be effective, the LICM 
assumes that principals and third parties must take into account situationally 
- specific dynamics. While some of the intervention strategies that work with 
marital partners in conflict (see Weingarten & Leas, 1987) have been found to be 
equally effective with business associates or neighbors, it is anticipated that 
additional strategies will need to be developed for use in conflict situations in 
which language and culture differ, where formal heirarchies exist, or in which 
coalitions have formed. 
Theoretically, the LICM allows that any individual may interact with others 
a t  escalated levels of conflict (e.g. Contests, Fights or War). In practice, however, 
some individuals never appear to engage in the more escalated levels of conflict 
interaction, even when they fail to resolve their disputes peacefully and the 
situational pressures to escalate are intense. In contrast, other individuals 
continue to function a t  escalated levels even when some differences have been 
resolved. In addition, the LICM recognizes that an individual's expressed level of 
conflict may reflect organizational or situational role constraints rather than more 
stable character traits or preferences. Thus, while the level of conflict in a system 
usually reflects the motivational dynamic of the most powerful individuals or 
coalitions, shifting a conflict to a different level is made considerably easier if even 
one key actor is inclined to move. Viewed from within the LICM, it is how 
individuals approach given issues that defrnes the conflict dynamics needing 
redress, rather than the substance or magnitude of those issues. 
Table 1 
Levele of Conflict Model 
Major 
Objective, Principal's 
Motive or Key View of Emotional 
Level Aim Assulrl~Cion Third Purtv Clirnute Negotiation Stvle 
I. 
Problems Solve the We cnn Ad v isor/ Hope Open, direct, clear and non-distorted 




11. 1 i 
Disagreements Self- Compromise Enabler/ Uncertainty Cautious sharing; vague and general 
prohtiorr is necessary mediator language; calculation beginning. I I 
111. 
Contest Winning Not enough Arbiter/ Frustration Strategic manipulation; distorted 
resources judge and resentment communication; personal attacks begin; 
to go around no one wanta to be the first to change. 
IV. 
Fight Hurting Winning is Purtisan Antagonism VerbaVnon-verbal incongruity; blame; 
the other impossible ally and alienation perceptual distortions evidenC; 
refuueal to take responsibility. 
v. 
War Eliminating Other people Reecuer or Hopelessnees Emotional volatility; no clear understanding 
the other are less human intruder and revenge of issues; self-righteous; compulrrive; 
than self inability to disengage. 
Level I: Problems 
Individuals or groups engaging a t  this level of conflict interaction are 
motivated by a desire to solve identifiable problems. Department heads in a 
Fortune 500 company a t  odds because one wants resources allocated to research 
and development and the other wants to increase the budget for sales and 
promotion are as likely to be in Level I conflict as are co-op members trying to 
decide whether to use plywood or pine boards for the shelves in their newly 
purchased produce market. A husband and wife arguing over where to spend 
their summer vacation may approach one another from the same conflict level as 
United States' and Soviet negotiators arguing over where to make strategic cuts in 
arms. 
At Level I, real differences exist and relational tensions stem from the fact 
that people perceive their goals, needs, action plans, and/or values to be in conflict. 
Communication problems may also exist, but they are not to be confused with the 
differences in interest that generate Level I conflict. Occassionally, it is believed 
that problems will disappear if clear communication can be fostered -- indeed 
many Track I11 diplomatic efforts seem grounded on such a hope. Yet, while 
improvements in communication can make i t  easier to discover joint interests, 
solve problems and negotiate differences, it should be kept in mind that individuals 
who learn to communicate more clearly are also in a better position to discover 
interpersonal differences that former communication barriers masked. 
Although individuals in Level I conflict may feel somewhat uncomfortable 
with one another, the overall emotional climate of Level I is hopeful. Principals in 
Level I conflict not only are willing to work together to overcome their differences; 
they want to do so and are seeking to discover how. While problem solving 
strategy preferences vary, in general, individuals a t  Level I tend to express a 
sense of individual responsibility for solving the problems they face and would 
rather "do it themselves" if circumstances permit than defer to representatives or 
mediators to do it for them. Consequently, when third parties are called in a t  this 
level, it becomes important that they not overstep a consultative role. 
Unlike individuals embroiled in higher level conflicts, individuals a t  Level I 
are able to focus on substantive issues and differentiate between the problem and 
the people involved in it. Level I individuals do not get involved in the 
personalities of those with whom they dif'fer. Fiather, with minimal 
encouragement and support, Level I disputants are likely to share information 
openly, in language that is relatively specific, oriented to the here and now, clear 
of blame, and free of innuendo. 
A n  assumption of interdependence and a respect for difference undergirds 
the bterpersonal approach of principals a t  Level I conflict. While there may be 
some resistence to self disclosure among Level I disputants, because of their 
dominant belief that "we are in this together," they will not withhold critical 
information to save face or to "protect" selfish interests. Consequently, the sticky 
problems that do emerge at  Level I tend not to derive from personality or ideology 
but rather from skill deficits in problem solving or cross-cultural communication. 
The expectation that one negotiating strategy or method of rational problem 
solving is appropriate for all disputes (c.f. Fisher and Ury, 1983) regardless of the 
substantive issues or cultural context may undermine understanding or agreement 
even when there is evident goodwill and willingness to cooperate. Following a 
program to develop a mutual definition of the problem, gather data, search for 
alternative solutions, and choose a solution by concensus, while facilitative of 
successful negotiation in some circumstances, may be obstructive in others, if, for 
example the differences between disputants lie in fundamental motives, values, or 
needs. 
A recent Track I11 diplomatic meeting of prominent Israeli and Palestinian 
political activists that I attended was almost derailed by the program developer's 
experience that previous Middle East delegations always approached one another 
and the issues competetively. As a consequence of his assumption that 
participants would approach dialogue with one another as a Level I11 "Contest," 
he stressed the importance of having third party mediators present ("Focus on 
process issues;" "When feelings get hot, interrupt the dialogue between the 
principals to reduce tension") who, if asked by the principals for their own views, 
would present themselves as "neutral" ("Avoid taking sides or being a judge;" 
"Don't express opinions about the issues"). 
Although these strategies had worked in previous dialogue situations, the 
individuals coming to this meeting, were prepared to utilize a Level I conflict 
approach. That is, they were strongly motivated to cooperate, they wanted to 
understand one another, and they felt little pressure to reach a quick agreement. 
Furthermore, as most of the delegates believed that the United States was a 
partisan player in Middle Eastern affairs, they were both suspicious and critical of 
the supposed "neutral stance" adopted by the American mediators and devoted 
considerable time trying to engage them in substantive discussion. Fortunately, 
the organizers of this meeting were not only willing to consider participant 
criticisms, they were able to make on-site, program design adaptations. 
Too frequently, individuals who approach conflicts as "problems to be 
solved" lack the conceptual, behavioral, or dispositional skills required for success 
in their endeavors. Even if individuals are motivated to problem solve, they may 
be unable to decide upon appropriate strategies. The psycholinguist George Miller 
has said: "Compared with television or telephone systems, human beings are more 
like bottlenecks than channels for the efficient flow of information" (Earl, 1988). 
Further, even if we can assume skill in decision making, the information needed to 
determine or reach satisfactory outcomes may be unavailable. 
I t  is important that the knowledge of skilled conflict managers not be lost, 
and that the work of academic social scientists be informed by their experience. 
Research on practice has demonstrated that if fundamental value or sovereignty 
issues are a t  stake, setting up negotiations prior to working to promote greater 
understanding between the parties is more likely to escalate the level of 
interpersonal conflict than resolve it (Weingarten, 1986). Similarly, in the absence 
of personal trust, the goal of cooperation is more likely to be achieved if the initial 
problem solving strategy is to listen to the other's point of view rather than to try 
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to persuade him or her of one's own or even to reach a collaborative agreement. 
-.- 
.-a - ..IJ Level 11: Disagreements 
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Individuals at Level I1 conflict believe that somebody is likely to get hurt, 
.= and they do what they can to avoid taking that role upon themselves. Here, the 
-. + E: principals' motivation is significantly changed from a Level I focus on substantive 
T %='- . -fr problem solving to a Level I1 concern with establishing a safe and trustworthy 
relationship. Although substantive differences are as likely to exist a t  Level I1 as 
at Level I, a t  Level I1 the relationship between disputants is perceived as 
ambiguous and risky. Consequently, concerns with self-protection and saving face 
must be addressed in their own right if any progress is to be made in resolving 
specific substantative issues in contention. 
Because trust is a critical dynamic of Level I1 conflict, principals at this 
level are likely to avoid confronting one another directly about their concerns and 
disagreements, although they may express occassional barbed comments when 
tensions mount. The earliest warning sign of systemic dysfunction is not the 
existence of conflict but lack of skill in dealing with it. This often brings on a 
lessening hope that it can be resolved satisfactorily. 
This is a stage in which coalition building and utilization becomes 
important. At Level 11, people start looking for help, and their most common 
strategy is to enlist friends to discuss problems, vent frustrations, and provide 
advice. Those drawn into the role of advice giver must realize that people in 
"Disagreement" don't feel safe sharing everything. Consequently they frequently 
mention only those things that are favorable to their particular position. Also, . 
attempts to manipulate others to do what a disputant wants without revealing 
much about himself also distorts the quality of information shared a t  this level. 
Consequently, systems in which there is considerable Level I1 conflict frequently 
suffer from information deficits and confusions. 
The tendency to withhold information which might be seen as unfavorable 
to one side and favorable for the other's is often justified by the belief that in any 
open confrontation someone will have to settle for less than they are getting a t  
present. The assumption that compromise is likely to be a IoseAose proposition, 
reduces each principals' willingness to collaborate in problem solving. 
Unlike Level I conflict in which principals would rather undertake their own 
problem solving efforts, a t  Level I1 disputants actively seek out third party 
assistance. A cautionary note should be sounded in this regard, however. 
Experience in family and organizational disputes has shown that professionals 
brought into Level I1 conflict can easily escalate interpersonal mistrust if their 
presence limits the opportunities principals have to establish or demonstrate their 
trustworthiness to one another in face to face encounters. 
Although principals at Level I1 conflict feel tense and vulnerable, they are 
more uncertain with one another than antagonistic. At this level, decisions to call 
in third parties to negotiate agreements need to be carefully considered. Future 
cooperation may be seriously undermined if disputants miss an opportunity to 
work together a t  a critical juncture early in the process. Often a t  Level 11, a crisis 
event triggers the realization that unless something is done soon, the conflict may 
escalate and the relationship among disputants deteriorate further. Although, the 
disputants may feel ambivalent about the compromises they perceive would be 
required to resolve their differences, in Level I1 conflict they recognize their 
interdependence and want to maintain a working relationship. Nonetheless, as 
the climate of uncertainty characterizing Level I1 conflict promotes defensiveness, 
it inhibits the establishment of the open communication required for optimal 
problem solving -- at least in traditional bargaining situations. 
An example of a conflict resolution strategy that takes Level I1 face-saving 
concerns and barriers to open communication into account is provided by Leonard 
Woodcock's account of his experiences negotiating with the Chinese during 1977 
and 1978 as President Carter's representative, and later Ambassador, to Beijing 
(Personal Communication, 1989). Appointed with the mandate to "normalize" 
relations with the Beijing government, the American position was that in return 
for such normalization, China needed to guarantee it would not use force against 
Taiwan. While it was politically unfeasible in the United States to normalize 
relations without either that guarantee or an agreement that the United States 
could continue to sell defensive arms to Taiwan, the United States had effectively 
accepted the proposition that there was only one China (with Taiwan being a part 
of China) in the Shanghai Communique of February 28, 1972. Demanding that 
China not use force against a part of itself was seen by Woodcock to be both an 
infringement of China's sovereignty and an initial bargaining position that the 
Chinese could not accept. 
As Woodcock described his dilemma, he needed to communicate that the 
United States needed to reserve the right to sell defensive anns  to the Taiwanese 
authorities in a way that would not undermine the forthcoming formal meetings 
about normalization of relations between the two countries. Needing to establish 
himself as trustworthy in the eyes of his Chinese counterparts and sensitive to 
their concerns with "face," this, in his own words, is how he proceded: 
In late 1977 and early 1978, a few, but not many, American tourist groups 
were coming to Beijing. Many wanted briefings from the Liason Ofice and 
these were given in our Public Dining Room (which was then our only 
Conference Room). Inevitably the Taiwan question came up and that was - 
always left for me to reply. My answer was given, not as an Ambassador, 
but as an American citizen deeply concerned about the need to normalize 
relations between China and the United States. I said that in my opinion, 
the President should recognize Beijing as the one government obviously 
representing China. I then went on that no American President could do 
this without being in a position to assure the American people that the well- 
.being of the people on Taiwan was reasonably protected. This required 
reserving the right to sell to the authorities on Taiwan, if need be, defensive 
arms. 
Adjacent to this dining room, separated only by a swinging door, was a big 
kitchen in which the Chinese house staff was usually located, one or two of 
whom readily understood English. I had always assumed the staff reported 
to their own government and, of course, I wanted them to convey my 
position. 
In order to make sure my position got back to the Chinese leadership, I 
sought meetings with three foreign Ambassadors in Beijing who I knew 
were very close to the Chinese. To them I conveyed that President Carter 
had decided to normalize relations in his first term and my position as to 
how it could be done while finessing the use of force question. When, out of 
these efforts, I got no answering echo from the Chinese, I felt confident in 
assuring my President that this could be done, if other matters could be 
handled satisfactorily. . . .The arms sales question was made.a 
confrontational issue on September 19, 1978, but, by that time, both sides 
knew that a way to a solution was open given a resolution of other items for 
which there were precedents. 
Level 111: Contest 
As hope diminishes that problems can be solved and face saved, power 
motives are aroused and "winning" becomes the focal dynamic of interpersonal 
conflict. In response to perceived differences of goals, needs, or preferences, Level 
111 disputants lose sight of their potential common interests, and this loss impairs 
their ability to recognize or appreciate their interdependence. The rhetoric of 
Level I11 conflict frequently stresses the right of persons (or nations) to act 
independently. Level I11 is the domain of the "self-determining" actor who seeks 
personal gain in an intrinsically competetive (e.g. resource deficient) universe. 
This is the level of conflict in which disputants identify "freedom" and 
"independence" as their most cherished values and then wonder why the victories 
they achieve a t  each other's expense seem hollow. 
At Level I11 conflict, issues have piled'up and are hard to disentangle. The 
emotional climate is one of frustration and resentment. Anger erupts easily --. 
often over issues the disputants themselves view as trivial - and dissipates slowly. 
Principals in "Contest" no longer find it easy to talk to one another informally. 
They point out inaccuracies in the other's position more to score points than to 
advance understanding, facilitate agreement, or solve problems. Perceptual 
-distobions abound and are reflected in communication styles; emotional appeals 
are common; each party assumes it knows the other's "real" intentions. At Level 
1II.there is reluctance to take the first step towards change because the individual 
fears-that such a move will be perceived by the other as a prelude to capitulation. 
While control and power issues play a profound part in the psychology of 
Level.111 contestants, they recognize that it will be impossible to achieve these 
.." 
ends if their relationship to one another is entirely severed. At Levels IV and V, 
antagonists are often satisfied by getting rid of the other. But a t  Level 111, 
contestants recognize the game can't continue without the other, and thus the 
relationship cannot be broken. Principals in Level I11 conflict frequently describe 
themselves as trapped. Their way of approaching their differences feels 
unsatisfactory. Yet the solutions they repeatedly try to implement, e.g. changing 
or controlling the other, do not seem to work. 
Fisher and Ury (1983) point out the dangers of rigidly adhering to 
intervention strategies which emphasize contest and ignore the common interests 
of people in conflict. They argue that victories achieved by the other's defeat will 
turn out to be self-defeating in the long run. Yet, rather than suggesting a 
fundamental transformation of the motive to win that adequately deals with the 
issues of power and resource scarcity, they propose a better mousetrap. 
According to their 1983 work, Fisher and Ury offer that if disputants follow 
their negotiation methods, it is possible to achieve long-term resolutions to conflict 
in which everybody wins and no one loses. Unfortunately, even if' one grants the 
desirability of their claims, psychologists have long recognized that many people 
(surely as well-represented in politics as in the family or the market) seem to have 
very little interest in the long run gains to be had from cooperation and 
considerable interest in maintaining or increasing their personal power in the here 
and now. 
Given some disputants' reluctance to abandon their quest for power, it 
seems that Fisher and Ury's model of conflict resolution may be less applicable to 
Level I11 Contest as understood within the LICM and better described as 
identifying "pseudo-contests." "Pseudo-contests" are a Level I strategy of problem 
solving that mimick the Level 111 Contest. "Pseudo-contests" occur when 
individuals compete with others not because of entrenched desires to win or 
because of resource scarcity but because acting competitively is the way they have 
been socialized to behave when confronted by perceived obstacles to need 
satisfaction or goal achievement. 
Competition is likely to be unavoidable when activities are structured so 
that the success of one person requires that others fail. In contrast, "pseudo- 
contests" do not require competition. Rather, the competition that occurs in such 
situations is not inherent in the structure of the activity but stems from 
participants' perception that one's win necessitates another's loss. Fisher and Ury 
clarify that many conflicts can be resolved without requiring that anyone lose. 
But in claiming that everyone can be a conflict "winner," they fail to discriminate 
the diversity of intentions or objective conditions that underlie conflict behavior. 
And this failure appears to derive from their acceptance and promotion of a 
competetive game metaphor as a cross-situationally applicable conflict analogue. 
Political science and anthropology provide ample evidence that the degree to 
which different cultures depend on competition to organize and structure their 
political, economic, educational or recreational systems varies broadly. As one 
commentator puts it: 
At one end of the spectrum are societies that function without any 
competition a t  all. At the other end is the United States. . . Not only do we 
get carried away with competetive activities. . . but we turn almost 
everything else into a contest. Our collective creativity seems to be tied up 
in devising new ways to produce winners and losers (Kohn, 1986). 
If we accept that cultures differ in their reliance on competition as an 
-.-. 
,. .z.a.. 
org&izing principle, it becomes critical to consider whether a scholarly literature 
,: -2. 
rife -with game analogies to describe the dynamics of interpersonal conflict plays a 
'.,. 7 
role beyond mere prediction in relation to competition. Social psychologists have 
." . 
I r. 
carrid out innumerable studies that demonstrate that if you treat a person 
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prepared to cooperate as a competetor, he is likely to reciprocate in kind. Given 
: .%?. 
this"& the case, scholars must consider the political role "science" plays when it 
encourages- readers to take an iterated prisoner's dilemma game seriously as a 
conflict analogue and use theory based on this reductionist metaphor to plan their 
actions. 
Even if more refined and comprehensive models of reality are available 
(Axelrod, 1984; Etzioni, 1988), it is frequently the case that they do not easily 
translate into situationally specific strategies of action. For example, while it 
would be hard to quarrel with' Axelrod's conclusion that in order to promote 
cooperation we should: "1. Enlarge the shadow of the future; 2. Change the 
payoffs; 3. Teach people to care about each other; 4. Teach reciprocity; and 5. 
Improve recognition abilities" (1984, pp. 126-139), we are given few guidelines or 
even examples of how this can be accomplished in the real world. 
In his The Evo- of Cooperation. Axelrod writes that to change a 
situation in which cooperation is not stable to one in which it is "[it] is only 
necessary to make the long-term incentive for mutual cooperation greater than the 
short-term incentive for defection" (1984, p. 134). Yet, when we consider such real 
life situations as the PalestiniadIsraeli conflict, for example, this proposal clearly 
seems easier said than done. 
Getting individuals in "pseudo-contest" (e.g. with Level I motives -- the 
desire to solve substantative problems -- and a competetive style of interacting) to 
adopt cooperative methods of negotiating is a relatively straightforward 
educational task. Similarly, if people are motivated to compete because they 
believe not doing so will threaten their survival in a resource scarce world, 
demonstrating that their assumption of scarcity is false often results in 
collaborative problem solving. Difficulties. resolving Level I11 conflicts in 
collaborative ways will persist, however, when the goal of winning is personally or 
culturally entrenched or the scarcity of resources is real. 
Disputants in "Contest" generally seek out third parties to bolster their own 
positions or when impasse occurs. In the latter circumstance, a common strategy 
is to call in outsiders to serve as arbitrators, judges, or peace keepers. Third party 
intervention can effectively reduce manifest expressions of Level I11 conflict. But 
when substituting external pressures to comply for personal commitments to 
change, further outbreaks of conflct may merely be postponed. As long as 
disputants understand their own interests to be independent and exclusive of those 
with whom they compete, they are likely to abandon competition only for as long 
as they are compelled to do so (Kelman, 1958). 
Level N: Fights 
Principals in "Fight" are noteworthy for their persistence in conflict 
behavior when chances of goal attainment are slim or non-existent. Believing it 
impossible to change their circumstances or to get important needs met with 
circumstances as they are combatants a t  Level IV conflict act as if making their 
opponents hurt is more critical than either winning or solving their problems. 
Level IV conflict is often a critical turning point for individuals. As hope for 
winning within the context of the circumstances dies, the emotional climate 
becomes one of alienation and antagonism. Outsiders are enlisted, not to help 
"save" the relationship between principals as in Levels I or I1 or to legitimize 
.-- - heirarchy as in Level 111, but as allies to challenge the status quo. In such a 
?.m ,--- system, images of the other become fixed and stereotyped. Even when there is 
.-r - evidence to the contrary, each side believes the other cannot or will not change. 
,a; ... -- Indeed when attempts by the other to modify their position are made, motives are 
:F?< ...-. questioned and charges of hypocrisy or manipulation leveled. 
....._. 
i > t ~ i s .  
,-. . Within organizations characterized by Level IV conflict, factions begin to 
emerge because individuals believe independent actions will expose them to too 
much risk. Consequently, the approval and support of a known group of allies 
becomes critical. In Level IV conflict, individuals know who is part of their group 
and who is not. If a person wants to become part of a faction, he or she may well 
have to do something to prove loyalty. Indeed, individuals may not feel like good 
members unless they can do something which demonstrates their willingness to 
"stand up and be counted." 
The behavior of guerilla fighters often appears to reflect Level IV conflict 
dynamics. Thomas Friedman, in describing the response of the Palestinians in 
1982 after the Israeli army cut through their lines in less than a week and 
reached Beruit, writes of his interview with George Habash, the leader of the 
Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (1989, pp.150-151): 
This pediatrician-turned-guerilla had been fighting the Israelis since 1948, 
when he was twenty-one. . . .To him the fact that the battle in south 
Lebanon had been lost seemed totally i n ~ i ~ c a n t .  The most important 
thing was that there had been a battle a t  all. . . ."I thank God," he shouted, . 
oblivious to the irony of the great Arab Marxist invoking the Almighty. "I 
thank God," he continued, bringing his fist down onto the table, "that I 
lived to see the day that a Palestinian army fought an Israeli army. Now I 
can die. I don't need to see any more." Waving his arm around a t  his 
young acolytes, he added, "I feel sorry if anything happens to these young 
men, but now I can die, for we really fought them." 
Implicit in this anecdote is another feature of Level IV conflict. As part of the 
faction dynamic of Level IV, strong, often charismatic leaders will emerge who are 
comfortable with the leadership role and the exercize of power. Leaders a t  Level 
IV conflict are generally available to their followers and willing to expend 
considerable personal energy and initiative working on group goals. They inspire 
loyalty not only because they oversee that followers function effectively but also 
because they appear willing to make personal sacrifices themselves. 
Given the stong within-group interdependence of Level IV actors (e.g. "It's 
us against them"), it becomes diEcult for individual members of a faction to argue 
with the leadership, and the quality of information available in such a system 
suffers. Furthermore, when individuals find themselves a t  odds with a leadership 
decision that necessitates comment, they will not do so where they can be observed 
by the members of the opposition. At Level IV, the "public" expression of in- 
group differences are likely to occur only when individuals are challenging the 
leadership heirarchy itself -- as appears to have been the case when Mr. Zhao 
Ziyang broke party ranks to speak with student demonstrators prior to the 
Tiananmen Square massacre in June, 1989. 
As part of the dynamic of Level IV, within-group cohesiveness and solidarity 
becomes more important than reconciling diverse constituencies or interest groups. 
At Level IV, antagonists are tied to a strong commitment to their "position" and 
resist suggestion that the priorities of their faction might be less important than 
the priorities of the larger organization or the reduction of tension within the 
system as a whole. In Level IV conflict, individuals measure their success 
primarily by whether they have subordinated opposing groups; only secondarily 
are they concerned with whether they have achieved their ends or those of the 
larger system as a whole. As a result, if a subgruoups' actions harm other 
factions, group members may express some sorrow or remorse that people had to 
be h y t ,  but will readily rationalize their behavior in terms of "the truth" being 
more important than any pain and suffering resulting from their actions. At Level 
.IV conflict, priorities and values have changed profoundly from those of- Levels I, 
- 11, or 111. Individuals have become more fured on ideology and their own personal 
(or subgroup) agenda. Commonly, they lose sight of the importance of community, 
divers$y, and relationship. 
The key to Level IV behavior rests in the fact that the conflict is structured 
in such a way that antagonists come to envision themselves as guardians of 
fundamentally exclusive principles. To outsiders it may seem as if the principals 
are merely incompatible. To the person experiencing Level IV intent, it appears 
that the course of action he or she is taking is necessary "to preserve identity," "to 
insure democracy," "to combat anarchy," and so forth. In other words, this is not 
a problem to be solved or even a contest to be won, Level IV actors see themselves 
as fighting oppression, perversion, or some other serious moral and ideological 
threat. 
It may further clarify Level IV conflict dynamics if, keeping in mind that a 
characteristic feature of escalating conflict is that the strategies of response 
become increasingly entrenched, we consider the evolution of the events 
culminating a t  Tiananmen Square in June 1989. According to the report of a 
Stanford historian living in Beijing for the year prior to and shortly beyond the 
"Massacre" (Benedict, 1989), the initial demonstrations following Hu Yaobang's 
death on April 15 could be seen as a Level I strategy focused on criticism and 
reform of Deng Xiaopeng's regime, not its overthrow, and confined to a relatively 
small group of activist students: 
. . .during the early weeks of the movement, most non-students continued to 
insist that they were simply not interested in politics. They seemed more 
amused than anything else by the earnest young students. On Tuesday, 
April 25, I was on a bus which passed some students from Beijing Normal 
University, carrying their school banner and talking to people on the street. 
A young worker on the bus cracked: "The Red Guards have arrived!", a 
remark that was met with laughter by others on the bus (p. 16). 
For the first week of the protests, Benedict's observations support newspaper 
reports that the Chinese authorities did not respond to student demonstrations 
with any show of force. On the morning of Hu Yaobang's funeral, April 22, 
however: 
. . .those of us who came late to the square were blocked from seeing much 
of anything by the thousand of police who stood shoulder to shoulder all 
around the perimenter of the square (p.15). 
According to Benedict, a further turning point in the evolution of the protest 
movement can be dated from April 26 when the People's Daily carried an editorial 
that charged that the student movement was a "planned conspiracy" calling for 
"grave political struggle" against the students. As a result of it becoming clear 
from that editorial that the government might well use force against the students, 
the "laogaixing" (common people) joined the April 27th march, swelling the ranks 
of demonstrators to over 150,000. 
With the expansion of the ranks of demonstrators to include the laogaixing, 
the character of the protest shifted. By May 15, she writes: 
Common people, the janitor in our building, the careteria workers, people I 
talked to on the street, all supported the students. Many did so because 
they believed that the students were the best hope of solving the twin 
problems of inflation and corruption: they were not particularly concerned 
with the broader issues of democracy and press freedom ... This outpouring of 
support had a darker side ... The student movement had become, almost 
overnight, one governed by emotion and passion. Now the demonstrators 
were out for blood, and they would not settle simply for a real "dialogue," 
they wanted nothing less than the collective resignation of the leadership. 
Where in the world, let alone the Communist world, would a government 
voluntarily leave power under such circumstances? (pp.29-30). 
According to the LICM, it is a hallmark of Level IV conflict that antagonists 
seek the assistance of third parties only as allies. To a person fighting for survival 
or principles, you are either with him or against him -- there is no other option. 
.- '
.-.* , 1. . *- To be neutral is perceived as adding power to the other side. Only if an outsider is 
on one's own side, can he or she be tolerated. Given this dynamic, the role of the 
'5' 
media as a shaper of conflict becomes critical. Although we don't generally think 
rLl . 
. 
of the media as a third party, in many instances it performs such a function -- and 
'L&- 
in Tiananmen Square the media appears to have played a central role in 
escalating a Level I protest &to a Level IV fight. 
Given the dynamics of Level IV conflict, i t  is expected that third parties, as 
uninvited observers and critics, will raise the stress experienced by Level IV 
principals. In general, as stress within a social system rises, the individual's 
ability to approach problems creatively and flexibly within that system declines 
(Janis and Mann, 1977). As "saving face" is a particularly important aspect of 
Chinese culture, a public loss of face is likely to be a particularly potent stressor 
within the Chinese cultural context. 
Perhaps if the foreign press had not been so insistent in promoting the 
student cause; perhaps if the protestors' disruption of Gorbachev's visit had not 
been so public a loss of face; perhaps if the students could have "improved their 
recognition abilities" and shifted their strategy when confronted with mounting 
opposition, cooperation between the antagonists could have been promoted and the 
violence avoided. Considering the third party presence provided by the world 
media to the events in China, use of the LICM would have predicted that the 
problem solving ability of Level IV principals would be disrupted and the conflict 
thereby escalated. 
To the extent that outsiders became involved in the outcome of events in 
China, the LICM assumes face-saving and competetive motives were aroused to 
the degree that the principals became both too stressed to problem solve and too 
invested to quit. Just as the involvement of third parties a t  Level I1 can escalate 
the conflict by diverting the trust-building process between principals, the 
involvement of non-allied third parties at  Level IV is likely to do the same unless 
their dealings with the principals occur out of the public eye. In working with 
Level IV combatants, change agents must learn that it is easier to block 
destructive exchanges by highlighting the costs of current competition rather than 
the benefits of future cooperation. This is often best done in private session. 
Similarly, helping Level IV disputants recognize how their current methods 
interfere with each achieving important personal values often motivates a 
willingness to change whereas a focus on the harm they are doing to the other 
does not. Such stratgegies take into account that the incentives for action 
operative a t  Level IV are vested in individual interests rather than in relationship. 
Despite the fact that principals at  Level IV have lost sight of 
interdependence, would-be intervenors must ask whether the world media having 
served to escalate the conflict by its mere presence shares a t  least some 
responsibility for the June 6 massacre. Deng justified the Tiananmen Square 
massacre as a rational response to an irresponsible factional effort to bring down 
the system of government he was committed to support. The United States' 
backing of the Nicaraguan Contras demonstrates that in this country we are not 
always against internal factions using force against compatriots. Considering this, 
on what basis then can either Deng's view of "the facts" or his choice of response 
be challenged? These questions are raised not because there are readily apparent 
answers but rather to highlight that understanding the contribution of values as 
an inextricable part of conflict and its resolution becomes increasingly critical as 
the stakes of conflict mismanagement become increasingly profound. 
Level V: W a r  
At Level V, conflict has become intractable. Differences of interest are not 
only viewed as mutually exclusive, the claims of one party are perceived by the 
other as a threat to  onotological security. Enemies at  "War" experience high 
levels of anxiety which they believe can only be assuaged by the other's defeat. At 
war, combatants have no compunctions against the use of compulsion and force -- 
they are relentless in trying to accomplish their aims; vengeful and vindictive 
when frustrated. 
At Level V, objectivity has been lost to subjectivity. Information is skewed 
and %ationality is rampant. There is no longer any clear understanding of the 
issues -- personality has become the issue. Level V behavior is part of a simple 
and heroic drama that the combatant has fixed in his head which may or may not 
be related to what is actually going on in the world. In "War," principals see 
themselves as utterly responsible for the survival of their cause. They view 
themselves as the sole protectors of important principles, facing detractors, 
invaders and destroyers who must be stopped at all costs. 
The emotional climate 'of enemies a t  "War" is characterized by volatility, 
rage, and hopelessness. Combatants feel hopeless about their ability to achieve 
security or satisfaction while the enemy still exists. Because of this loss of 
confidence in their individual ability to achieve important ends, they seek out and 
are susceptible to external directives and guidance. In addition, because they 
believe there is no place untainted by the other, the costs of withdrawal are seen 
as greater than the costs of engaging in a battle to the death. Consequently, a t  
Level V, there is often focus on tales of matrydom -- Masada for the Israelis, the 
promise of Paradise for Islamic fundamentalists who die fighting in Allah's jihad 
(Wright, 1985). 
At both Levels IV and V, group members may perceive themselves to be 
part of an eternal cause, fighting outsiders for unambiguous principles. However, 
unlike leaders a t  Level IV who consider themselves and their followers to be 
"comrades in arms," Level V leaders generally are career oriented professionals 
who have undergone training that encourages them to consider their followers to 
be resources or chess pieces rather than unique and irreplacable individuals. Level 
V leaders are drawn from specialized elites; they are generals from academies 
rather than enlisted men or draftees who rise from the ranks. 
If we consider modern and global warfare, a critical distinguishing feature is 
the diversity of intentionality that characterizes its principal participants. Modern 
warfare and "War" as defined by the LICM are not synonymous. If a soldier is 
invested in Level V intentionality as defined by the LICM, he cannot choose to 
stop fighting because to do so would be immoral and irresponsible. Mercenaries or 
generals, in contrast, may view their participation in warfare more as a Level I 
problem solving exercise than as a result of uncompromisable principles. 
Consequently, interventions for dealing with the realities of war must necessarily 
be inclusive of all the levels of conflict so far considered rather than being 
attentive solely to the fifth category within the model designated as "War." 
Within the LICM, the distinction made between Level. IV and Level V 
conflict inheres in fundamental issues of intentionality and value rather than of 
behavior or attitude. At both levels there are principals who believe that to quit is 
to be more than disloyal; to rein in one's zeal is to be a traitor to the cause. At 
both levels, those who are really committed, will sacrifice all. Only a t  "War" 
however, will participants treat not only their antagonists as less than human, but 
their compatriots as well. 
Ends are all important a t  Level V and any means are seen to justify them. 
A characteristic of Level V conflict is that one doesn't have to do much thinking 
about the ethics of means. Though the losses may be great (and though important 
principles, like the dignity of individuals or freedom, may have to be 
compromised), the ends are so important that one need only worry about 
"temporary" breaches (e.g. such as sending troops on missions known to be 
suicidal) after the principles one is fighting for have been restored. 
A key assumption of individuals in Level V conflict is that other people are 
less human than oneself. This is the realm of "Ilit" relationships dominating and 
eliminating the "IPrhou" (Buber, 1970). Theoretically, "War" as defined by the 
LICM can exist without the use of physical force or armaments. In practice, 
however, it appears as if once human beings are reified and seen as manipulatable 
objects, rationalizing violent use of them and against them to achieve one's ends 
ij" 
becomes inevitable. 
When enemies not only objectify and do violence against each other but also 
against their allied subordinates, the prognosis for human survival is bleak. Even 
when powerful third parties levy pressures or incentives compelling the principals 
to restore a semblance of "peace," periods of non-violence under such conditions 
are rarely stable. To manage battering couples, separating the partners and 
maintaining the partition between them long enough so that agreements of 
nonaggression can be put into operation and enforced has been shown to be a more 
effective first step than are programs which initially attempt to work with the 
principals conjointly. 
However, experience with intimate enemies suggests that agreements of 
non-agression will only be sustained over the long run if the individual's sense of 
identity becomes invested in the practice of non-violence and cooperation rather 
than these being compelled by pressure from outside. An implication for action 
that derives from this insight is that persons concerned with creating the 
conditions for peace must attend as much to the building of character as to the 
dismantling of bombs. 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
The Levels of Interpersonal Conflict Model was designed to clarify the 
multiple and divergent conflict dynamics that are usually lumped together when 
questions such as "Why do men fight?" are put on the table. The title of this 
paper asks how important it is to know the intentionality of a negotiator. 
Throughout, numerous situations are described that demonstrate not only how 
different motivational dynamics lead to different behaviors under similar stimulus 
conditions of conflict but also how seemingly similar conflict behaviors that derive 
from different intentional bases will be responsive to different incentives and 
pressures for change. 
From such a model, it is hoped that practical knowledge can be derived so 
that conflict need not escalate to "Contests," "Fights," or "War." There is a great 
deal of biological, historical, and psychological evidence documenting and justifying 
the propensity of human beings to engage in violent conflict with one another. Far 
less attention is given to understanding the circumstances which lead human 
beings to sustain situations of cooperation and peace in the face of scarce resources 
and pressures to compete. 
Comparisons of human beings to self-serving prisoners or to termites, 
baboons, and buck deer are useful when they allow us to recognize that doing 
violence against one's own is an easily evoked human potential. The shortcomings 
of such comparisons are evident, however, in their failure to explain the behavior 
6f an Oscar Arias or a Mother Teresa. In their failure to take into account these 
prototypically human actors, these comparisons promote the illusion that biology 
in the absence of culture is the determining influence in human affairs. 
Understanding that human behavior is influenced not solely by "objective 
conditions" but also by what situations "mean" requires models of interpersonal 
conflict that account for the fact that human beings interpret reality as they 
respond to it. Knowing that a person pursues sexual gratification or happiness 
tells us very little about him or her that is individually predictive; for that, we 
need to know the principle under which these goals are operative. There are 
people who are happy only in meeting the needs of others and people who feel 
pleasure or arousal only in the face of another's total subjugation and humiliation. 
4 .  Models of human behavior that fail to take these divergencies into account 
are, at  best, merely reductionistic and of interest to a limited audience. When 
interpersonal lk differences are misconceived, mishandled, and escalated because the 
models available to interpret and influence them conceive of conflict only as a 
Level I11 and above process, such models can be downright dangerous. 
The LICM recognizes that it is not the seriousness of the issue that 
determines the level of interpersonal conflict, but the motivation and behavior of 
the principals. In surfacing difference, conflict presents each of us with the 
opportunity to advance human development through the discovery of integrative 
and non-violent problem solutions. Only if we model ourselves after the best of 
humanity, the creators and caretakers among us rather than the exploiters and . 
killers, may we yet avoid what Hobbes predicted for humanity -- a future that is 
"mean, nasty, brutish and short." 
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